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The complementarity between segment disclosure and 
earnings quality, and its effect on cost of capital 
 
 
 
We investigate the role of earnings quality in determining the levels of segment 
disclosure, and whether and how better quality earnings and segment disclosure 
influences cost of capital. Using a large US sample for the period 2001-2006, we find a 
positive relation between earnings quality and levels of segment disclosures. We also 
find that firms providing better quality segment information, contingent upon good 
earnings quality, enjoy lower cost of capital. We base our empirical tests on a self 
created index of segment disclosure. Our results contribute to a better understanding of 
(1) the incentives for providing segment disclosures, and (2) how accounting quality 
(quality of segment information and earnings quality) is related to the cost of capital. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we investigate the relation between 
earnings quality and segment disclosure. Second, we analyze whether firms providing 
higher quality of segment information enjoy a lower cost of capital. For the analysis of 
the relation between earnings quality and segment disclosure we create an index of 
quantity of voluntary segment disclosure. We use the residuals of a regression of 
quantity of segment information on the determinants of segment disclosure as a proxy 
for the quality of segment disclosure. We argue that quality (and not quantity) of 
segment disclosure will have an impact on cost of capital. 
We expect that earnings quality and segment disclosure will be related in a 
predictable way. The literature on information economics suggests that firms provide 
information to decrease information asymmetries (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Milgrom, 
1981; Verrecchia, 1983). This provision of information could be achieved through 
several channels, including the reported accounting numbers and through additional 
disclosure. Verrecchia (1990) and Penno (1997) directly model the relation between 
earnings quality and disclosure, showing that more expansive disclosure is expected in 
firms with better earnings quality. However, results in the empirical literature are 
mixed, probably due to the use of empirical measures of disclosure that include 
information expected to be useful for investors (that disaggregates, explains or 
complements the reported numbers) and information that is difficult to verify and that 
might not be useful for investors. 
In this study, we focus on segment disclosure. Prior literature suggests segment 
disclosure is useful for investors and increases firm value, as it increases the value 
relevance of accounting numbers (Chen and Zhang, 2003), it improves monitoring over 
management decisions, while diminishing agency costs (Hope and Thomas, 2008), and 
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helps reducing information asymmetries (Greenstein and Sami, 1994). Consequently, 
we expect firms providing better earnings quality will also be likely to provide 
comprehensive segment disclosure to additionally decrease information asymmetries 
and increase firm value. Thus, we expect that, holding everything else constant, firms 
with better earnings quality will prepare more expansive segment disclosures.  
The second objective of this paper is to study the relation between cost of capital 
and quality of segment information. There is an ongoing debate on whether and how 
accounting quality decreases cost of capital. One stream of literature suggests that 
information asymmetries affect the cost of capital: accounting quality reduces these 
information asymmetries; which in turn, affects the cost of capital (Easley and O’Hara, 
2004). More recently, several studies demonstrate that information differences across 
investors affect a firm’s cost of capital through information precision, and not 
information asymmetry per se (Hughes, Liu and Liu, 2007; Lambert, Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2007, 2008). As shown in prior research (Kinney, 1971; Collins, 1976; 
Baldwin, 1984; Balakrishnan, Harris and Sen, 1990), segment reporting improves the 
predictive ability of accounting numbers. Consequently, we expect that improved 
segment information will facilitate the estimation of firms’ cash flows, which in the 
Lambert et al. (2007, 2008) setting will lead to lower cost of capital. 
Using a sample of non regulated and non financial firms for the period 2001-
2006, we find that firms providing high quality segment disclosure, contingent upon 
good earnings quality, enjoy lower costs of equity capital. This result is robust to 
controls for the determinants of segment disclosure, and to the use of asset-pricing 
based tests and implied cost of capital based tests. In addition, we provide empirical 
evidence that segment disclosure improves investors’ ability to estimate firm’s cash 
flows by showing that better quality segment disclosure, contingent upon good earnings 
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quality, reduces analysts’ forecast errors. Also, we show that the provision of high 
segment information quality, having good earnings quality, leads to a reduction in the 
firm’s assessed covariance with other firms’ returns. This is consistent with quality of 
segment disclosure reducing estimation risk. Unlike Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2008), 
we use a proxy of disclosure quality, not a proxy of disclosure quantity. Our results 
show that it is the quality of disclosure, not the quantity of disclosure, which reduces the 
cost of capital. The quantity of segment disclosures is only a proxy of the activity of the 
firm (i.e., a firm provides more segment information when it is more diversified). 
 Our study contributes to the ongoing debate on whether accounting quality 
decreases cost of capital by providing empirical evidence that better quality segment 
disclosure, when complemented with good earnings quality, improves investors’ ability 
to estimate firm’s cash flows, which leads to a decrease in cost of capital.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoretical 
development on the relation between segment disclosure, earnings quality and cost of 
capital. In Section 3 we present the research design, describing our proxies for the 
quantity and quality of segment information, the method to analyze the relation between 
earnings quality and segment information and the methods used to study the impact of 
segment information quality on cost of capital. In Section 4 we present the results. 
Finally Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. SEGMENT DISCLOSURE, EARNINGS QUALITY AND COST OF CAPITAL 
Companies are increasingly international and increasingly diversified. The 
valuation of an international or a diversified firm requires information not only about 
overall firm activity, but also about segments of the firm because performance, risk and 
potential growth of different business or geographical lines vary appreciably (SFAS 
131, Ernst and Young, 2005; Palepu, Healy and Bernard, 2004). Investors and analysts 
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need segment information as they require information to help them in predicting firm’s 
future cash flows. Without this disaggregation in segments, predicting future cash flows 
of the firm becomes more difficult (AIMR, 1993). As a response to users requests, 
regulators require segment disclosure with the objective of providing “information 
about the different types of business activities in which a firm engages and the different 
economic environments in which it operates to help users of financial statements to a. 
Better understand the enterprise’s performance, b. Better assess its prospects for future 
net cash flows and c. Make more informed judgments about the enterprise as a whole.” 
(FAS 131, paragraph 3). 
A wealth of academic research has focused on segment reporting, showing 
several benefits of improved segment information: (i) it is expected to help current and 
potential investors to improve their capital allocation decisions. Previous literature finds 
that segment characteristics are useful in equity valuation and that the value relevance 
of accounting numbers is higher in firms that provide disaggregated segment 
information rather than in firms that do not disaggregate such information, especially 
when operating segments have increasingly different profitability and growth 
opportunities (Foster, 1975, Tse, 1989;  Basu, Kim and Lim, 1999; Wysocki, 1998; 
Chen and Zhang, 2003); (ii) it permits better monitoring of manager’s decisions, 
decreasing information asymmetries between managers and debt– and equity– holders, 
reducing empire building decisions and improving investment efficiency. Previous 
literature shows that when firms provide information about the diversification of the 
firm and about the resource transfers across segments, they facilitate and improve the 
monitoring over manager decisions, and reduce information asymmetries (Greenstein 
and Sami,1994; Berger and Hann, 2003, 2007; Hope and Thomas, 2008); and (iii) it is 
useful to financial analysts, who will use the more comprehensive segment information 
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to improve their earnings forecasts. In this context, previous literature shows that 
analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts if they have available good quality 
segment data (Kinney, 1971; Collins, 1976; Baldwin, 1984; Balakrishnan, Harris and 
Sen, 1990; Hussain, 1997). 
 
2.1 Segment information and earnings quality 
 Accounting information is critical to the well functioning of the economy 
because decisions on the allocation of resources are based, to a large extent, on the 
information provided by the accounting system. Accounting information is flexible to 
allow managers better capture the underlying economic fundamentals of the firm. 
However, managers can use this discretion opportunistically to their own benefit. A way 
to prevent such behaviour is the provision of better quality accounting practices, which 
ameliorate the problems caused by information asymmetries (LaFond and Watts, 2008). 
However, even if reported numbers provide a true and fair view of the situation of the 
firm, it is likely that, given that reported numbers are too aggregated, they are not 
sufficient to make appropriate economic decisions. Segment disclosure helps in 
disaggregating the information and facilitates an efficient allocation of resources. 
As segment information disaggregates accounting numbers to provide  details 
concerning different business or geographical lines, we expect that firms with better 
earnings quality will have incentives to provide more comprehensive segment 
information to help investors in making appropriate investment decisions. Managers of 
firms providing better earnings quality will be keen on complementing earnings 
information with additional segment disclosure to additionally increase firm value. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: As the quality of earnings increases, the comprehensiveness of 
segment disclosure will increase. 
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Our first hypothesis is consistent with analytical research showing that firms 
providing better earnings quality are expected to provide more extensive disclosure. 
Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988) propose a model in which information quality is 
the probability that the manager of the firm is privately informed. They study his/her 
decision of whether to disclose this private information, and show that as information 
quality increases, the manager has more incentives to disclose his/her private 
information since the market is more likely to interpret nondisclosure as bad news. 
Similarly, Verrecchia (1990) and Penno (1997) propose a model in which information 
quality is the precision of the manager’s private information. They show that, since the 
market knows how the information quality is, disclosure is more probable in firms with 
better information. 
 Prior empirical research on the relation between reported numbers and 
disclosure offers conflicting results. While Lang and Lundholm (1993) and Tasker 
(1998) find a substitutive relation, others, like Imhoff (1978), Waymire (1985), Cox 
(1985) and Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2008) find a complementary relationship. These 
conflicting results are mainly attributable to the use of a type of disclosure that do not 
necessarily captures useful information to investors. Therefore, these disclosures do not 
lead to improvements in the firm value. 
 
2.2 Earnings quality, segment information and cost of capital  
There is an ongoing debate on whether accounting quality decreases cost of 
capital. Some studies suggest that information asymmetries affect the cost of capital. As 
accounting quality reduces information asymmetries, it affects the cost of capital 
(Easley and O’Hara, 2004). More recently, several studies demonstrate that information 
differences across investors affect a firm’s cost of capital through information precision, 
and not information asymmetry per se, and once one controls for information precision, 
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information asymmetries have no effect on the cost of capital (Hughes et al., 2007; 
Lambert et al., 2007, 2008). In the empirical literature the results are mixed. While 
Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker (2003), Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2004, 
2005) and Francis et al. (2008) find a negative relation between accounting quality and 
cost of capital, others like Core, Guay and Verdi (2008) or McInnis (2008) fail to find 
any relation between several proxies of accounting quality and cost of capital. 
The provision of accurate information is the key element for predicting and 
estimating firm’s risk, which leads to better investment decisions (Lambert et al., 2007, 
2008). Given that segment information disaggregates the whole activity of the firm 
providing details of different business or geographical lines in which the firm is 
involved, this type of information is crucial for investors and analysts. However, the 
quantity of segment disclosure is only capturing the degree of diversification and not the 
quality of the disclosure itself. That is, quantity of segment disclosure is not a good 
indicator of investors being able to estimate firm’s cash flows more accurately. 
Conversely, a measure of quality of segment disclosure that controls for the degree of 
diversification (both at the industry and geographical level) captures whether the firm 
provides more segmental information than expected given its degree of diversification. 
Such measure of quality of segment disclosure will be a good indicator of investor’s 
capability to estimate firm’s cash flows, which in turn reduce the estimation risk. 
However, this reduction can only happen when the quality of segment disclosure goes 
in hand with accounting numbers that provide a true and fair view of the situation of the 
firm. In this case segment information quality will really contribute to facilitate the 
estimation of firm’s cash flows. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms providing better segment information, contingent upon high 
earnings quality, are expected to be rewarded with a lower cost of capital. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN  
3.1 Creation of an index of quantity of segment disclosure (Qtt_Seg) 
To elaborate our own index for the quantity of segment disclosure (Qtt_Seg), we 
analyze disclosures on both business and geographic segments. In a first step, for every 
mandatory reported business/geographic segment in each firm, we analyze whether they 
provide information on the compulsory SFAS 131 items and on additional items from 
the balance sheet and the income statement (See the Appendix for detailed information). 
Next, we collect all items provided for every voluntary business/geographic segments, 
and we create the business/geographic segment score by adding 1 point for every 
voluntary disclosed item in every business (Qtt_Seg_Bus)/geographic (Qtt_Seg_Geo) 
segment. Finally, we create the overall index on quantity of voluntary segment 
disclosure (Qtt_Seg) by adding the business and geographic segment scores. 
 
3.2 Determinants of segment information and creation of an index of quality of 
segment disclosure (Qlt_Seg) 
 
 To explore if earnings quality is a determinant factor in explaining segment 
disclosure policy, we regress a fixed effect model of quantity of segment information 
(Qtt_Seg) on earnings quality, the main determinants of segment disclosures (business 
and geographic diversification as well as information asymmetries) and controls. The 
model is as follows: 
Qtt Segj,t = α + β1 Earnings Qualityj,t +β2 Business Diversificationj,t +  
 + β3 Geographic Diversificationj,t  + β4 Information Asymmetriesj,t-1 + 
 + β5 Sizej,t + β6 Growthj,t + β7  Leveragej,t +β8 Audit Firmj,t +         (1) 
 + β9 Listing Statusj,t + β10 Proprietary Costsj,t  + 
 + β11 New Financingj,t + β12  Profitabilityj,t + β13Agej,t + 
+Σ
 k βk Control year j,t +εj,t  
 
We take the residuals of Model (1) as our proxy of the quality of segment 
reporting. We expect that when firms provide more (less) information than predicted by 
the model, they will contribute to improve (reduce) investors’ ability to estimate their 
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cash flows. Our final proxy for segment disclosure quality, Qlt_Seg is a discrete 
variable defined in terms of the decile ranks in which the residuals of regression (1) are 
distributed. Large values of Qlt_Seg indicate better segment information quality. 
 
3.2.1 Earnings Quality 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts earnings quality will contribute to increase disclosure 
levels. Given this, we expect a positive relation between proxies for earnings quality 
and Qtt_Seg. To estimate earnings quality, we use the modified Jones model as defined 
by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995): 
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where: TAj,t1 is firm j’s total accruals in year t, Assetsj,t is firm’s j total assets 
(Compustat #6) at the beginning of year t; ∆REVj,t is firm’s j change in revenues 
(Compustat #12) between year t-1 and t; PPEj,t is firm’s j gross property, plant and 
equipment (Compustat #7) in year t.  
 We estimate equation (2) using data annually for each 2-digit SIC industry 
groups. Next, for each firm j, we calculate its discretionary accruals as: 
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(3)           
where: γβα ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  = the fitted coefficients in model (2) and ∆ARj,t is the change in account 
receivables for firm j (Compustat #2) in year t. 
 We use the absolute values of DA, multiplied by minus one, as our main proxy 
for earnings quality. Large values correspond to good accrual quality (Earnings_Qlt), 
that is, less discretionary accruals. 
                                                 
1
 Measured as ∆CAj,t – ∆CLj,t – ∆Cashj,t + ∆STDEBTj,t – ∆DEPNj,t;  ∆CAj,t is firm j’s change in current assets (Compustat #4) 
between year t-1 and year t; ∆CLj,t  is firm j’s change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) between year t-1 and year t; ∆Cashj,t is 
firm j’s change in cash (Compustat #1) between year t-1 and year t; ∆STDEBTj,t is firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities 
(Compustat #34) between year t-1 and year t; ∆DEPNj,t firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14) in year t.  
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3.2.2 Business diversification 
 We include business diversification as a determinant of segment disclosure as 
more diversified/complex firms are expected to report information on a larger number 
of business segments than less diversified ones. To create an index of business 
diversification we use the primary and secondary SIC codes that Compustat assigns to 
each firm.2 For every firm, we create the business diversification score by assigning 1 
point for every different 2-digit SIC code assigned by Compustat to the firm as forming 
part of its primary or secondary activities. 
 
3.2.3 Geographic diversification 
 We include geographic diversification as a determinant of segment disclosure. 
We define our geographic diversification index as the number of different countries 
where the firm has subsidiaries3. For example: if a given company X has four 
subsidiaries, one in Spain, one in Italy and two in Croatia, we assign to this company a 
geographic diversification score of 3, as there are three different countries in which it 
has subsidiaries. 
 
3.2.4 Information asymmetries 
Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that the demand for disclosure arises from 
information asymmetries and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors. 
Managers disclose information to reduce information asymmetries. Given this, we 
include a proxy for information asymmetries, the bid-ask spread, as a determinant of 
segment disclosure. We measure the bid-ask spread as: 
 
                                                 
2
 Compustat assigns a four-digit Primary SIC code to each firm by analyzing the product line breakdown that firms provide in each 
10-K. The assigned classification is reviewed each year when the company is updated. 
3
 We use subsidiaries information from Osiris. We take into account subsidiaries with a minimum of 25,01% of control by the 
company under analysis. 
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where: bidj,t is the firm’s j annual mean of the monthly bid prices for year t, and 
askj,t  is the firm’s j annual mean of the monthly ask prices for year t. 
 
3.2.5 Controls 
Size, Growth and Leverage 
 Previous literature finds that corporate size is significantly and positively 
associated with disclosure levels. That is, larger companies disclose more (Buzby, 1975; 
Diamond and Verrechia, 1991, Giner, 1997). This relation also holds for segment 
disclosure levels (Leuz, 2004). We measure firm size as the natural logarithm of firm’s 
market value, measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. We also include firm’s 
growth, measured as the logarithm of the firm’s book to market ratio at the beginning of 
the fiscal year (Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). With respect to leverage, prior 
studies analyzing its relation with disclosure levels find mixed results (Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994; Leuz and Verrechia, 2000). Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argue that leveraged firms incur in larger monitoring costs. To 
reduce these costs they are expected to increase disclosure. We measure leverage as the 
ratio of total debt to total assets. 
 
Audit firm, Stock Exchange Status and Proprietary costs 
Whether the firm is a Big Four client or a non-Big Four client has an impact in 
disclosure levels (Wallace et al., 1994, Hope, 2003). Large and well-known audit firms 
pressure their clients for better disclosure. To capture variation in pressures for 
additional disclosure coming from the auditing firms, we include and auditor dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the auditor is a Big Four firm, and 0 otherwise. 
Regarding where the firm is listed, Wallace et al. (1994) and Leuz and Verrechia (2000) 
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find a significant relation between disclosure and the listing status of the firm. We 
control for this including a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is listed in 
the NYSE or in NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise. Proprietary costs influence segmental 
disclosures (Botosan and Standford, 2005). Thus, we include the Herfindahl index as a 
proxy for proprietary costs. We calculate the industry concentration using the following 
Herfindhal index:  
2
1
∑
=








=
N
i j
ij
j S
S
Herf                                           (5) 
where Sij = Business i’s sales (segment i’s sales) in industry j, as defined by two-
digit SIC code; Sj = The sum of sales for all businesses in industry; Sij/Sj = Business i’s 
market j share; N = The number of businesses in industry j. 
The greater (lower) Herfj, the higher the current level of industry concentration 
(competition) for industry j. 
 
New financing, Profitability and Age 
We expect that if the firm is looking for additional capital funds managers will 
be more likely to provide additional disclosure in an attempt to reduce the costs of these 
new financing sources (Barry and Brown, 1984, 1985, 1986; Sengupta, 1998; Healy, 
Hutton and Palepu, 1999, Ahmed, Billings, Morton and Stanford-Harris, 2002; Easley 
and O’Hara, 2004; Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005). Accordingly, we include a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the firm raised new capital funds or increased debt in a 
given year, and 0 otherwise. Additionally, we include profitability, measured as return 
on assets (ROA), as an additional control variable. Finally, we include firm age, 
measured as the difference between the current year and the first year in which the firm 
appears in CRSP database. 
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3.3 Testing the relation between cost of capital and the quality of segment disclosure 
 We use four different sets of tests to analyze the relation between cost of capital 
and the quality of segment information. First, we study if higher segment information 
quality facilitates predictions about firm’s future cash flows by analyzing whether such 
information reduces analysts’ forecast errors. Second, we test if higher segment 
information quality reduces the firm’s assessed covariance with sector firms’ returns, 
which in Lambert et al. (2007) setting will lead to a reduction in the cost of capital. 
Third, we use an implied cost of capital measure to study the relation between segment 
information quality and cost of capital, and finally, we investigate whether market 
participants are pricing segment information quality.      
 
3.3.1 Analysts’ forecast errors 
More comprehensive segment information is useful for analysts because it helps 
to predict more accurately earnings per share (Hopwood et al., 1982; Silhan, 1983; 
Baldwin, 1984; Swaminathan, 1991; Balakrishnan et al., 1990; Hussain, 1997). Finger 
(1994) and Dechow (1994) among others, find that earnings help to predict firm’s cash 
flows. Thus, as a first initial test of Hypothesis 2, we study whether better quality 
segment disclosure, having good earnings quality, reduces analysts’ forecast errors. To 
do so, we use the following model, estimated with industry fixed effects: 
 Forecast errorj,t =  α + β1 Qlt_Segj,t + β2  DummyEarningsQualityj,t  +  
  +  β3 Qlt_Segj,t *  DummyEarningsQualityj,t  +  
+ β4 Number analysts j,t + β5 DesvForecast j,t +          (6) 
+ β6  Size j,t+ Σ k βk Control year j,t+ εj,t    
                   
 
The coefficient of interest in Equation (6) is β3. A negative coefficient would 
mean a reduction in forecast error when segment information quality increases and 
earnings quality is high (above the median for the sector and year), that is, when 
segment information quality and earnings quality complements each other to reduce 
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forecast errors. We include the number of analysts following the firm as a control as 
prior research shows that this variable is associated to smaller forecast errors. 
Consequently, we expect a negative and significant β4 coefficient. We also include the 
deviation of forecasts as a control, as prior research shows this is associated to higher 
forecast errors. This means a positive and significant β5 coefficient. Finally, we include 
firm size as prior research shows this is associated to lower forecast errors (negative β6 
coefficient).   
 
3.3.2 Firm’s assessed covariance with other firms’ returns 
In the Lambert et al. (2007) setting, the quality of accounting information can 
influence the cost of capital. They show that higher quality disclosures reduce the firm’s 
assessed covariance with other firms’ cash flows, which is non-diversifiable, and in 
turn, it reduces cost of capital.  To test it empirically, we use actual returns as our proxy 
of firm’s future cash flows, since returns are, by definition, the present value of 
expected future cash flows of the firm. We define the firm’s assessed covariance with 
returns of firms in the same sector as an empirical proxy for the firm’s assessed 
covariance with other firms’ cash flows. We measure it as the mean of annual 
covariance between monthly returns of the firm and monthly returns of the sector in 
which firm operates. With this test, we analyze whether better quality segment 
disclosure, conditional to high earnings quality, reduce the firm’s assessed covariance 
with other firms’ returns in the same sector, which in turn contributes to reduce the cost 
of capital. Then, we use the following model, estimated with industry fixed effects: 
 Cov(ri, rsector)j,t =  α + β1 Qlt_Segj,t + β2  DummyEarningsQualityj,t  +  
  + β3 Qlt_Segj,t *DummyEarningsQualityj,t  + β4 Sizej,t +  
+ β5 Booktomarket j,t + β6 Herfj,t + β7 Leveragej,t +                   (7) 
+ β8 BusinessDiversification j,t + β9 GeographicDiversificationj,t+  
+ β10 ListingStatusj,t + β11 Profitabilityj,t+ β12 Agej,t + 
+ Σ
 k βk Control year j,t+ εj,t                         
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 The coefficient of interest in Equation (7) is β3. A reduction in risk due to 
increases in information quality, contingent upon good earnings quality, will mean a β3 
significantly negative. That is, if segment information quality and earnings quality 
complements each other to reduce the assessed covariance with sector firms’ returns, β3 
will be significantly negative.  
Regarding the control variables in Equations (7), previous literature finds that 
size, industry concentration, age, listing status and diversification of the firm decrease 
firm’s beta (Subrahmanyam and Thomadakis, 1980; Fama and French, 1992, 1993, 
Caves, 1982; Kim, Hwang and Burgers, 1989; Lubatkin and Rogers, 1989; Harvey, 
1991 Kim Hwang and Burgers, 1993; Qian, 1996). In the same way, we include book-
to-market, leverage and profitability, as previous literature finds that beta increases with 
these variables (i.e. Fama and French, 1992, 1993).  
 
3.3.3 Implied cost of capital tests 
The third set of tests consists of regressing a measure of implied cost of capital 
on quality of segment disclosure, high earnings quality, the interaction between quality 
of segment disclosure and high earnings quality and control variables commonly used in 
the cost of capital literature: size, the book-to-market ratio, beta, long term growth, 
leverage and diversification. To explore whether segment information quality reduces 
cost of capital contingent upon high earnings quality, we estimate the following model 
using industry fixed effects: 
rPEG j,t = α + β1Qlt_Segj,t + β2DummyEarningsQualityj,t + 
+ β3Qlt_Segj,t*DummyEarningsQualityj,t+ β4 Sizej,t + 
+ β5 Booktomarketj,t +  β6  Betaj,t +  β7 Leveragej,t           (8) 
+ β9 BusinessDiversification j,t + β10 GeographicDiversificationj,t+  
+ Σ
 k βk Control year j,t+ εj,t            
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The coefficient of interest in Equation (8) is β3. A reduction in cost of capital 
related to increases in segment information quality, contingent upon good earnings 
quality, will lead to a β3 significantly negative. That is, if segment information quality 
and earnings quality complements each other to reduce the cost of capital, β3 will be 
significantly negative.  
As a proxy for implied cost of capital we use the PEG ratio proposed by Easton 
(2004) as follows:  
0
45
P
epseps
rPEG
−
=
               (9) 
where: epst is earning per share in year t. We use five-year long-term growth rates from   
I/B/E/S to calculate eps4 and eps5. P0 is the market price of a firm’s stock. Pastor, Sinha 
and Swaminathan (2008) find that implied cost of capital proxies based on analysts’ 
forecasts capture well variation in cost of capital. At the same time, Botosan and 
Plumlee (2005) find that the PEG ratio is positively related to risk measures, and, 
consequently, it is a good proxy of implied cost of capital. To calculate it, Botosan and 
Plumlee (2005) use earnings per share forecasts in years 4 and 5 because this proxy 
requires positive changes in forecasted earnings and changes between years 4 and 5 in 
forecasted earnings are more likely to be positive rather than changes in near-term 
forecasts.  
Regarding the control variables in Equations (8), previous literature finds that 
increases in size lead to a decrease in the cost of capital (Fama and French, 1992, 1993; 
Hail and Leuz, 2006). We measure size as the logarithm of market value. The market 
perceives high-growth firms as riskier, consistent with the asset pricing theory. 
Consistently, we also include the log of the book-to-market ratio (Fama and Frech, 
1992, 1993; Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 2001; Hail and Leuz, 2006) because it is 
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expected to increase the cost of capital. Also, the CAPM suggests that market beta 
should be associated with the cost of equity. Then, we include beta, measured as the 
coefficient from firm-specific CAPM regressions of firm’s returns, using the 60 months 
preceding fiscal year t, and a value weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq as market index 
return. Additionally, we include leverage, as it drives cost of capital upwards 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Fama and French, 1992, 1993). Finally, we include firm’s 
diversification, as it is associated with lower risk (Caves, 1982; Kim et al., 1989; 
Lubatkin and Rogers, 1989; Harvey, 1991, Kim et al., 1993; Qian, 1996). 
 
3.3.4 Asset pricing tests 
In addition to the implied cost of capital-based tests to study whether quality of 
both segment information and earnings are associated to lower cost of capital, we use 
the Fama and French Three Factor Model (1992, 1993), which has recently been applied 
in the accounting literature (Core et al., 2008; Francis et al., 2008, McInnis, 2008) to 
study the relation between cost of capital and proxies for the quality of accounting 
information. If segment information quality and earnings quality are priced risk factors, 
then each of them should be related to average stock returns.  
We group firms into portfolios, as realized returns employing cross-sectional 
tests are noisy at the firm level4. We include size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML) 
portfolios as in Fama and French (1992, 1993). We also include the excess market 
return (RMRF)5. Each month, from 1/1/2001 to 12/31/2006, we create a hedge portfolio 
based on the earnings quality measure, buying 20% of firms providing the best earnings 
                                                 
4
 One criticism of cross-sectional tests is that realized returns are noisy, particularly at the firm level. That is, firm-specific news 
may be so huge and include any pattern that exists in realized returns related to accounting quality. To deal with this concern, we 
perform portfolio time-series regressions in the tradition of Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972). 
 
5
 Factors of Fama-French Three Factor Model are extracted from Kenneth R. French’s webpage. 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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quality and selling 20% of firms providing the worst earnings quality. Then we estimate 
the following time series regression for the hedge earnings quality portfolio:  
tttt
f
tjt HMLSMBRMRFRR εβββα ++++=− 321
                                      
(10) 
In this model, α represents the average excess return of the one predicted by the firm’s 
sensitivity to the risk factors in the model. If the model is properly specified (that is, it 
includes all risk factors that affect the firm), the estimated α should be zero (Black, 
Jensen and Scholes, 1972). However, if the model omits a risk factor, then portfolios 
with greater exposure to that factor will have higher α, because they have greater 
average excess return unexplained. If earnings quality is a risk factor, and it is 
orthogonal to beta, size and book-to-market effects, then we should observe increasing 
estimates of α in equation (10) as we move from good to poor earnings quality 
portfolios, so we expect a negative and statistically significant α of the hedge portfolio 
(long on firms providing the best accounting quality and short on those with the worst 
accounting quality).  
We perform the same analysis for the hedge segment information quality 
portfolio, buying 20% of firms providing good segment information and selling 20% of 
firms providing poor segment information. 
Finally, we estimate the time series regressions in Equation (10) for the hedge 
accounting information quality portfolio, (Acc_Qlt) that contemplates earnings quality 
as well as segment information quality. To build this new variable, first, we create a 
dummy variable of earnings quality: we rank earnings quality according to the median, 
and we assign 1 if a firm provides earnings quality above the sector-year median and 0 
otherwise. Second, we create a dummy variable of segment information quality: we 
assign 1 if the residuals of model 1 are positive and zero otherwise. Finally we sum 
these two dummy variables to measure overall accounting information quality 
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(Acc_Qlt). We create the hedge Acc_Qlt portfolio buying firms providing good 
segment information and good earnings quality (Acc_Qlt=2) and selling firms not 
providing neither good segment information, nor earnings quality (Acc_Qlt=0). As 
before, we expect a negative and statistically significant α of the hedge portfolio of 
both, segment information quality and accounting information quality. 
In addition, we investigate if earnings quality and segment disclosure quality, 
separately or together, have an influence over firms’ realized returns. To do this we 
create a HILOEarnings_Qlt factor, a HILOQlt_Seg factor and HILOAcc_Qlt factor. The 
HILOEarnings_Qlt factor is the return of the accruals quality factor-mimicking 
portfolio for earnings quality. We rank Earnings_Qlt into quintiles and we take a long 
position on the two quintiles with the best accrual quality and a short position in the two 
quintiles with the worst accrual quality. We perform the same analysis for the 
HILOQlt_Seg factor, taking a long position on the two quintiles with the best segment 
information –larger values of residual in equation (1)– and a short position in the two 
quintiles with the worst segment information lower values of residual in equation (1). 
Finally, the HILOAcc_Qlt factor is the return of the accounting information quality 
factor-mimicking portfolio for Acc_Qlt, in which we take a long position on the firms 
with the best accounting information –firms providing good segment information and 
good earnings quality– and a short position in the portfolio with the worst accounting 
information –firms not providing neither good segment information, nor earnings 
quality–. We then use a two-stage cross-sectional regression approach, where excess 
returns are regressed on risk factor betas.  
In the first stage, we estimate multivariate betas from 25 portfolios shorted on 
B/M and Accounting Quality6 using a time-series regression of excess returns for a 
                                                 
6
 The portfolios are the intersections of 5 portfolios formed on the ratio of book equity to market equity and 5 portfolios formed on 
the interaction between Qlt_Seg and DummyEarningsQlt. 
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portfolio on the contemporaneous returns to the Fama–French factors, the earnings 
quality factor and the segment disclosure quality factor: 
tt
tttt
f
tpt
QltgsHILOEarnin
SegHILOQltHMLSMBRMRFRR
εβ
ββββα
++
+++++=−
 _
_
5
4321
      (11) 
where Rp,t is the return of portfolio p for month t. RMRF is the monthly excess return on 
the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX market index return from CRSP. SMB (Small minus 
Big) is the monthly return of small firms over big firms, and HML (High minus Low) is 
the monthly return of high BM firms over low BM firms. HILOQlt_Seg is the monthly 
return of good quality segment disclosure firms over poor quality segment disclosure 
firms and HILOEarnings_Qlt is the monthly return of good earnings quality firms over 
poor earnings quality firms. 
To test whether combining segment information quality and earnings quality has 
a larger impact in excess returns than earnings quality and segment information quality 
separately, we estimate multivariate betas from a single time-series regression of excess 
returns for a firm on the contemporaneous returns to the Fama–French factors and the 
factor that combines the earnings quality factor and the segment information quality 
factor: 
ttttt
f
tpt QltHILOAccHMLSMBRMRFRR εββββα +++++=− _4321    (12) 
 where all variables are the same as those in Equation (11) and HILOAcc_Qlt is 
the monthly return of good accounting information quality firms over poor accounting 
information quality firms. 
In the second stage, we collect the portfolio-specific loadings from (11) and 
(12), respectively, and estimate the factor premium conditional on the first stage 
loadings with cross-sectional regression using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure 
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to mitigate concerns about cross-sectional dependence in the data. The model for the 
earnings quality factor and the quality of segment information factor is as follows:
          
     
tQltEarningsSegQltHMLSMBRMRF
f
tpt RR εβδβδβδβδβδα ++++++=− _5_4321
      
(13) 
 Firms providing better earnings quality and better segment information quality 
should enjoy lower cost of capital, so δ4 and δ5 are expected to be negative.  
Finally, the test of whether firms providing better segment information quality 
complemented with better earnings quality enjoy lower cost of capital is conducted 
estimating the following model: 
tQltAccHMLSMBRMRF
f
tpt RR εβδβδβδβδα +++++=− _4321
        
(14) 
Consistently with the individual analysis of earnings quality and segment 
information quality, we expect that firms providing better overall accounting 
information quality have smaller excess returns. Consequently, we expect a risk 
premium –δ4– to be significantly negative. This means, in accordance to our implied 
cost of capital tests, that firms providing good segment information quality 
complemented with good earnings quality will enjoy a higher reduction in cost of 
capital.  
 
3.4 Sample Selection  
 We extract a sample of non financial and non regulated firms from the 
Compustat annual files, for the period 2001 to 2006, with the necessary data to calculate 
the earnings quality measures and all variables needed for our disclosure tests. The 
number of subsidiaries, used to calculate our proxy for geographic diversification, is 
extracted from BvD Osiris7. Market data are extracted from CRSP and analysts data 
from I/B/E/S. Our final sample comprises 10,002 firm-year observations with data on 
                                                 
7
 We assume the number of subsidiaries does not change if the data is not available for one year. (i.e., if a firm has no data for 2004, 
we assume that the number of subsidiaries is equal to that of 2005)  Results are robust to the use of a smaller sample in which we 
drop firms with no available data on the number of subsidiaries in all the years of the sample. 
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all variables to run all of our tests. We exclude observations with missing data from any 
of the variables needed. To mitigate the undesirable effect of outliers, we delete the top 
and bottom percentile of the distributions of all variables.  
The mean (median) number of items reported by our sample firms is 42.25 (39), 
with a standard deviation of 20.29 (Table 1). Note that the standard deviation is high, 
but it is mainly due to the different number of reported segments among firms. The 
minimum items disclosed are 10 while the maximum are 149 (not tabulated). Data 
indicate substantial variation in voluntary segment disclosure levels across the sample 
firms. Regarding accruals quality, the mean and median values are slightly larger than 
those reported in previous studies (i.e., the mean and median abnormal discretionary 
accruals using the modified Jones model in Francis et. al (2008) are, respectively, 
0.0159 and 0.0123, while is our study they are -0.0743 and -0.0349 –negative values 
because we multiplied them by -1–). Mean leverage is 20.19%, indicating that our 
sample firms are relatively low leveraged, but are issuing new debt or equity to finance 
their projects (mean value of Newfin=0.88). Also, most of our sample firms are audited 
by Big-4 firms, and are listed in NYSE or Nasdaq.  
 
4. RESULTS  
4.1 The relation between earnings quality and segment disclosure 
In Table 2 we show the pairwise correlations between Qtt_Seg, earnings quality, 
and firm characteristics. Earnings quality is significantly and positively related to 
Qtt_Seg (22%). This is preliminary evidence of the complementary relation between 
earnings quality and quantity of voluntary disclosure, as we predict in hypothesis 1. 
Much as expected, business diversification and geographic diversification are very 
strongly correlated with Qtt_Seg (31 and 10% respectively). Also, information 
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asymmetries (the bid-ask spread) is, as expected, positively correlated with Qtt_Seg 
(2.8%). 
In Table 3 we show the results of an industry fixed effect regression of Qtt_Seg, 
our proxy for the quantity of segment disclosure, on the determinants of segment 
disclosure. In the first column, we only include the controls. We find that the quantity of 
segment disclosure (Qtt_Seg), as expected, increases with firm size, the book to market 
ratio, leverage, being audited by a big-four firm, being listed in NYSE or NASDAQ, 
issuing new financing and firm age, and decreases with profitability and proprietary 
costs. All of the firm controls are significantly associated with quantity of segment 
information at conventional levels. These results corroborate that our index of voluntary 
segment information (Qtt_Seg) is a valid measure of disclosure.  
In the second column of Table 3 we show the results of estimating Equation (1). 
Results confirm that β1 is positive and significant (β1=8.06 –p-value =0.000–). This 
confirms the complementary relation between earnings quality and segment disclosure. 
Results also point out that, independently of the level of earnings quality, firms 
operating in a higher number of sectors provide more comprehensive segment 
information, as well as those firms operating in a higher number of countries. Finally, 
we have found that firms with higher information asymmetries provide more segment 
information. Our results are robust to the use of other earnings quality measures8, and to 
the use of geographic and business segment quantity measures separately instead of the 
aggregate measure Qtt_Seg. Concerning to the fitness of the model, the results show 
that determinants of disclosure explain a significant amount of the variation in Qtt_Seg 
(around 30%). 
 
                                                 
8
 Based on the absolute values of the residuals of the Jones (1991), Dechow and Dichev (2002) and McNichols (2002) models, and 
on the standard deviation of the residuals of the Jones, modified Jones and Dechow and Dichev models, calculated at the firm level 
using rolling windows of ten years as in Francis et al. (2004). 
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4.2 The relation between segment disclosure and cost of capital 
4.2.1. Forecast errors and segment disclosure 
In Table 4 we show the results on whether segment disclosure reduces analysts’ 
forecasts errors. In the first column of the table we show the results of the regression of 
forecast errors on quantity of segment information, analysts’ following, deviation of 
forecasts and size. As mentioned in the theoretical section, we do not expect quantity of 
segment disclosure to be a good indicator of investors being able to estimate firm’s cash 
flows more accurately. The results show a mean estimate of β1 = -0.0001 (p-value 
0.275), so, as expected, we do not find a significant relation between quantity of 
segment information and forecast errors. However, when we use segment disclosure 
quality instead of quantity (columns two and three), the results show a negative and 
significant coefficient on quality of segment disclosure (β=0.0074 and p-value=0.006 
when we do not control by earnings quality and β=0.0073, p-value=0.000 when we 
control by earnings quality). So, we find that better quality segment information reduces 
forecast errors. We also find that having earnings quality above the median also 
contributes to a decrease in forecast errors.  
Finally, in the last column of Table 4 we include in the specification the 
interaction between segment disclosure quality and earnings quality. We expect that the 
coefficient of this interaction –β3 in specification (6)– is significant and negative, 
indicating that the reduction in forecast errors as the quality of segment information 
increases, is larger when earnings quality is high. The results show a mean estimate of -
0.0146 (p-value 0.023). Now, the coefficient of segment quality is not significant any 
more, indicating that only firms with better quality of segment information and high 
earnings quality facilitate earnings forecasting, and hence, only with better quality of 
segment information and high earnings quality, firms facilitate the predictions about 
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firms’ future cash flows. In fact, when segment information is of high quality and 
earnings quality is not, the result is the opposite (positive coefficient of Qlt_Seg in 
column 4). Thus, superior levels of voluntary disclosure when accounting numbers are 
of bad quality generate more uncertainty and have damaging effects on forecasts. 
Another explanation could be that once we include interaction effect, as firms will not 
have incentives to provide high segment information quality, as given that the 
information that it disaggregates is not reliable, this coefficient will be only capturing 
firms providing poor segment quality information, which is not useful for analyst in 
making their forecasts.  
The F-ratio test on the R2 increment is statistically significant at p-value 0.04 (no 
tabulated), so we should take into account that quality of segment information and 
earnings quality are related when we explain their effect on the forecasts error. Given 
this result, we expect firms providing high segment disclosure quality will enjoy lower 
cost of capital only when earnings quality is high.9 T 
 
4.2.2. Firm’s assessed covariance with other firms’ returns and segment quality 
In Table 5 we show the results on whether segment disclosure reduces firm’s 
assessed covariance between firm’ returns and returns of these firms operating in the 
same sector. In the first column of the table we show the results of the regression of 
covariance between firm’ returns and returns of firms in the same sector, on quantity of 
segment information and controls. As before, we do not expect quantity of segment 
disclosure reduce the risk of the firm, because giving more information does not 
necessarily means more accurate information. The results confirm this statement as the 
coefficient of Qtt_seg = -0.0006 (p-value 0.184) is not significant. When we use 
                                                 
9
 We do the same analysis for business segment information quality and geographic segment information quality (no tabulated). The 
results show that firms providing good business segment information quality, complemented with good earnings quality reduce their 
forecast error, as well as those firms providing good geographic segment information quality, complemented with good earnings 
quality. 
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segment disclosure quality instead of quantity (columns two and three), the results show 
a negative and significant coefficient on quality of segment disclosure. So, we find that 
better quality segment information reduces assessed covariance with sector firms’ 
returns. We also find that having earnings quality above the median also lead to a 
reduction in the risk of the firm.  
Finally, in the last column of Table 5 we include the interaction between 
segment disclosure quality and earnings quality. We expect that the coefficient of this 
variable is significant and negative, indicating that when firms have higher earnings 
quality, the quality of segment information reduce the risk to a larger extend than when 
earnings quality is low. The results show a mean estimate of -0.0023 (p-value 0.004). 
However, the coefficient of segment disclosure quality is not significant at conventional 
levels, indicating that when segment information quality and earnings quality does not 
complement each other to reduce the estimation risk, segment disclosure quality does 
not reduce it. As before, it seems that superior levels of voluntary disclosure when 
accounting numbers are of bad quality does not provide useful information to investors, 
or it can be that firms providing poor earning quality do not provide high segment 
quality information. The F-ratio test on the R2 increment is statistically significant at p-
value 0.0002 (no tabulated), so we should take into account that quality of segment 
information and earnings quality are related when we explain their effect on the 
estimation risk. These findings suggest that firms with better quality of segment 
information provided the earnings quality is high, reduce the estimation risk of the firm. 
In Lambert et al. (2007) setting, these results are consistent with that firms providing 
high quality segment disclosure, contingent upon high earnings quality will enjoy lower 
cost of capital.10 
                                                 
10
 Our results are robust to the separate use of business segment information quality and geographic segment information quality 
(no tabulated).  
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4.2.3. Ex-ante cost of capital estimates and segment disclosure 
In Table 6 we show the pairwise correlations between the main variables of 
interest for the tests where we study the relation between segment disclosure and ex-
ante estimates of firms’ cost of capital. Quantity of segment information (Qtt_Seg) is 
not related to the cost of capital (rPEG) in a significant way (-0.33%), which is a signal 
that firms providing larger quantities of segment information do not reduce their cost of 
capital. On the other hand, we have found that quality of segment information (Qlt_Seg) 
is negatively and significantly associated with rPEG (12.83%), which suggests that firms 
with better quality segment disclosure enjoy a lower cost of capital, as we predict in 
Hypothesis 2. As expected, earnings quality is negatively related with rPEG (12.36%) 
indicating that firms with good earnings quality enjoy lower cost of capital.  
In Table 7 we show results of regression of implied cost of capital on segment 
information quality, high earnings quality, interaction between segment information 
quality and high earnings quality, and controls. In the first column of this table we 
validate our proxy for the ex-ante cost of capital. We find that the cost of capital 
decreases with firm size and firm’ diversification and increases with the book to market 
ratio, beta and leverage. These results, consistent with the evidence in Botosan and 
Plumlee (2005), suggest rPEG is a valid proxy for cost of capital, as it has the expected 
relation with all of the already mentioned risk proxies. 
In this table we also show the results on whether segment disclosure reduces cost 
of capital. In the second column of the table we show the results of the regression of ex-
ante cost of capital on quantity of segment information and controls. As expected, the 
coefficient on Qtt_Seg is not significant (-0.0002, p-value 0.264), so we fail to find any 
significant relation between quantity of segment information and cost of capital. When 
we use segment disclosure quality instead of quantity (columns three and four), the 
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results show a negative and significant coefficient on quality of segment disclosure. So, 
we find that better quality segment information reduces cost of capital. In addition, we 
find a negative coefficient on earnings quality (-0.0139), and significant (p-value 
0.000). The inclusion of earnings quality in the model does not eliminate the impact of 
segment disclosure quality in reducing the cost of capital (the coefficient on Qlt_Seg is 
still negative and significant at conventional levels).  
Finally, in the last column of Table 7 we include in the estimation the interaction 
between segment disclosure quality and earnings quality. The results show that the 
coefficient of this interaction term is negative -0.0032 and significant (p-value 0.000). 
Also, consistently with the previous tests on firm’s risk, the coefficient on segment 
disclosure quality when accounting quality is not high becomes not significant. The F-
ratio test on the R2 increment is statistically significant at p-value 0.000 (no tabulated), 
so we should take into account that quality of segment information and earnings quality 
are related when we explain their effect on the cost of capital. This result suggests that 
only firms with better quality segment information and high earnings quality enjoy a 
lower cost of capital11. 
 
4.2.4. Asset-pricing-based tests of the relation between segment disclosure and cost of 
capital 
In Table 8, Panel A we show that the descriptive statistics for the variables used 
in the asset pricing tests. We can see that the excess market return is positive in our 
sample, and that smaller and high book-to-market firms have higher returns than larger 
and low book-to-market firms. Firms presenting better accounting quality have lower 
returns (cost of equity capital) than firms presenting lower accounting quality. This 
result is consistent with that on size given the high correlation between size and 
                                                 
11
 Our results are robust to the use of geographic and business segment quality measures instead of the aggregate measure Qlt_Seg. 
 
  
29
accounting quality. In Panel B we show the pairwise correlations between the factors of 
the model. We also find a positive relation between returns of earnings quality and 
quality of segment information (39%).  
In Table 9 we explore whether accounting quality (measured as earnings quality 
–Earnings Quality–, segment information quality –Qlt_Seg–, and overall accounting 
quality –Acc_Qlt–) is a risk factor and whether it decreases the cost of capital.  If 
accounting quality is a risk factor we should observe a negative and statistically 
significant α of the hedge portfolio (long on firms providing good accounting quality 
and short on those providing poor accounting quality). In column three of this table, the 
results show an α= -0.00052 (p-value 0.000), then accounting quality is an omitted 
factor in Fama-French Three Factor Model as firms providing poor accounting quality 
have greater average excess returns unexplained. 
In Table 10, we show the results on whether segment disclosure reduces cost of 
capital using asset pricing tests. We find that the sensibility of portfolios returns on 
segment information quality is negative. However, when we include earnings quality (in 
Table 10, column 9), the sensibility of portfolios’ return to this factor is not significant 
anymore (p-value=0.120), while the sensitibity of portfolios’ return to segment 
information quality factor remains significant (p-value=0.067). Unlike the results in 
Francis et al. (2008), we find that the effect of segment information quality on cost of 
capital is robust to the inclusion of earnings quality. Finally, in the last column of Table 
10 we explore whether overall accounting quality reduces cost of capital and results 
show that this factor is significant (p-value=0.058). In fact, the added reduction when 
segment information quality and earnings quality are complementary in the mean cost 
of capital for 25 portfolios shorted on book-to-market and accounting quality is of -
0.0007121 (no tabulated), which is consistent with those results obtained from Table 9. 
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Our results are robust to the use of the CAPM, and to the inclusion of excess market 
return, size and book to market factors (the three factor model). The use of geographic 
and business segment quality factors instead of the aggregate HILOAcc_Qlt offers 
qualitatively similar results (no tabulated).  
In Table 11 we present the results of the two-stage regression to obtain the risk 
premium factors. We find that quality of segment information risk premium is negative 
(δ4 =-0.0187; p-value 0.003), that is firms providing better quality segment information 
enjoy lower excess realized returns. However, earnings quality bears no risk premium 
anymore (δ4 =-0.0150; p-value 0.180) when we include the three factors as proposed by 
Fama and French (1992, 1993), and the quality of segment information factor. This 
indicates that earnings quality, as we measure it, is not a priced factor. This is consistent 
with the evidence in Core et al. (2008). We show that the coefficients of market risk 
premium, size premium and book-to-market premium are consistent with previous 
empirical evidence. In the last column of this table we show the results for the 
accounting quality factor –estimation of Equation (14)–. We find that when earnings 
quality and segment quality information are complementary, this accounting quality 
factor is, as expected, a priced risk factor (δ4 =-0.0148; p-value 0.014). These findings 
suggest that firms with better quality of segment information, when complemented with 
high earnings quality, enjoy a lower cost of capital. As in the first stage, these results are 
robust to the use of the CAPM, and to the use of the Fama and French (1992, 1993) 
three-factor model. 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we analyze the relation between segment disclosure and earnings 
quality, and the effects of improved segment disclosure and earnings quality on cost of 
capital. We focus on segment disclosure as it is expected to improve investors’ ability to 
  
31
estimate firms’ cash flows, and, consequently, to decrease cost of capital within the 
theoretical framework provided by Lambert et al. (2007, 2008). We create an index of 
quantity and an index of quality of segment disclosure. Using these indices we (1) find a 
significant positive association between segment disclosure and earnings quality: firms 
with better earnings quality have incentives to provide more comprehensive segment 
information; and (2) provide empirical evidence supporting the claim that through high 
segment disclosure quality, when earnings quality is high, investors are better able to 
estimate firm’s cash flows more accurately, and, as a result, demand lower returns 
(lower cost of capital for a firm). Our results regarding the negative relation between 
segment disclosure and cost of capital are robust to the use of asset pricing based tests 
and implied cost of capital based tests. We also find that analysts’ forecast errors are 
smaller for firms providing better segment disclosure. In addition, we provide empirical 
evidence supporting that firms providing higher segment disclosure, conditional of 
having good earnings quality, reduce the firm’s assessed covariance with sector firms’, 
which is non-diversifiable, and in turn, it reduces cost of capital within the theoretical 
framework provided by Lambert et al. (2007). 
Our results contribute to the current debate (Hope and Thomas, 2008), started 
after the passage of SFAS 131, on whether it is advisable to reduce the amount of 
geographic segment information that firms are obliged to present. We show that 
disaggregating information by geographic segments helps estimating firms’ future cash 
flows, and as consequence, improved geographic segment information contributes to 
lower cost of equity capital. 
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APPENDIX: Index of quantity of voluntary segment disclosure 
 
A.1 Distinguishing between mandatory and voluntary segment information  
 
A.1.1. Identifying reportable business segments. 
 
We consider as operating segment based on management reporting system all business 
segments available in Compustat.  
 
To identify which segments are reportable segments to be disclosed, we begin by 
investigating if segments meet the quantitative thresholds, according to paragraph 18 of 
SFAS 131: 
 
“a. Its reported revenue, including both sales to external customers and 
intersegment sales or transfers, is 10 percent or more of the combined revenue, internal 
and external, of all operating segments. 
b. The absolute amount of its reported profit or loss is 10 percent or more of the 
greater, in absolute amount, of (1) the combined reported profit of all operating 
segments that did not report a loss or (2) the combined reported loss of all operating 
segments that did report a loss. 
c. Its assets are 10 percent or more of the combined assets of all operating 
segments.” 
 
If they meet these thresholds we consider directly these segments as reportable 
segments to be disclosed.   
 
The next step is to sum the revenue of the segments that meet the quantitative 
thresholds, to know if they account for 75% of consolidated revenue, if they do not, we 
take additional segments until they account for 75% of consolidated revenue, and we 
consider these as reportable segments to be disclosed. 
 
Another requirement is, according to the paragraphs 22 and 23 of SFAS 131, to 
consider reportable segments in a given year those segments considered as reportable in 
the previous or in the next year (we only meet this requirement if it is possible to do it 
with data that we have).  
 
Finally, we take into account every year that the maximum number of reportable 
segments is ten, so we consider only a maximum of ten reportable segments each year 
(those identified in Compustat in line of business, because there is an item identifying 
these ten business segments (Business segments-Actual Number)), considering as 
prevalent paragraph 18 over 22-23 in case that the number of business segments 
exceeds ten. 
 
 
A.1.2. Mandatory business segment information for reportable segments 
 
Once we have identified reportable segments to be disclosed, we identify the items to be 
disclosed according to SFAS 131: 
 
“a. General information as described in paragraph 26 
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b. Information about reported segment profit or loss, including certain revenues 
and expenses included in reported segment profit or loss, segment assets, and the basis 
of measurement, as described in paragraphs 27-31” 
 
Taking into account the information we have available, mandatory items for 
each reportable segment, as SFAS 131 state in paragraph 26-31, are the following:  
 
1. Business Segment Name (as the general information required in paragraph 26)  
2. Depreciation, depletion and amortization per segment. 
3. Equity in earnings per segment. 
4. Operating profit per segment. 
5. Sales to Principal Customer per segment.  
6. Sales of Principle Product per segment. 
7. Customer Name per segment. 
8. Investment at equity per segment (2-8 as the requirements of paragraph 27-
28). 
 
A.1.2. Voluntary business segment information  
 
We consider as voluntary business segment information the other items for reportable 
segments, and all items for non-reportable segments. We also consider as voluntary 
business segment information all available information for those business segments that 
exceed ten for each firm. 
 
A.1.3. Mandatory geographic segment information. 
 
We consider as geographic areas all geographic segments available in Compustat.  
 
SFAS 131, paragraph 38 states “An enterprise shall report the following 
geographic information unless it is impracticable to do so:  
 
a. Revenues from external customers (1) attributed to the enterprise’s country of 
domicile and (2) attributed to all foreign countries in total from which the enterprise 
derives revenues. If revenues from external customers attributed to an individual foreign 
country are material, those revenues shall be disclosed separately. An enterprise shall 
disclose the basis for attributing revenues from external customers to individual 
countries. 
b. Long-lived assets other than financial instruments, long-term customer 
relationships of a financial institution, mortgage and other servicing rights, deferred 
policy acquisition costs, and deferred tax assets (1) located in the enterprise’s country of 
domicile and (2) located in all foreign countries in total in which the enterprise holds 
assets. If assets in an individual foreign country are material, those assets shall be 
disclosed separately.” 
 
Taking into account the information we have available, mandatory items for 
each reportable segment, as SFAS 131 state in paragraph 38, are the following:  
 
1. Sales net per segment (as required in paragraph 38-a). 
2. Identifiable assets per segment (as required in paragraph 38-b). 
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A.1.4. Voluntary geographic segment information 
 
We consider as voluntary geographic segment information the other available items. 
 
A.2. Procedure for elaborating the segment disclosure score 
 
For every reported business segment in each firm, we analyze whether they provide 
information on the compulsory SFAS 131 items and on additional items from the 
balance sheet and the income statement. We create the business segment score by 
adding 1 point for every voluntary disclosed item in every segment. Then, for every 
reported geographic segment in each firm, we analyze whether they provide information 
on the compulsory SFAS 131 items, and on additional items from the balance sheet and 
the income statement. We create the geographic segment score by adding 1 point for 
every voluntary disclosed item in every segment. Finally, we create the voluntary 
segment disclosure score adding the business segment disclosure score and geographic 
segment disclosure score. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
10% 
 
25% 
 
Median 
 
75% 
 
90% 
Qtt_Seg 10,002 42.2542 20.2906 20 27 39 53 69 
Qlt_Seg 10,002 0.0000 15.1765 -17.5237 -10.2192 -1.8707 8.6758 19.1472 
Qtt_Seg_Bus 10,002 23.3837 17.4141 8 9 18 33 47 
Qlt_Seg_Bus 10,002 0.0000 13.3659 -14.0958 -9.1850 -2.5236 6.7440 17.6357 
Qtt_Seg_Geo 10,002 18.8705 9.0299 11 11 17 24 31 
Qlt_Seg_Geo 10,002 0.0000 7.6832 -8.8721 -5.3393 -0.7478 4.1548 10.1924 
Earnings_Qlt 10,002 -0.0743 0.1118 -0.2097 -0.0970 -0.0349 -0.0000 -0.0000 
BusDiversif 10,002 1.9679 1.1461 1 1 2 2 3 
GeoDiversif 10,002 3.0755 4.2204 1 2 2 3 5 
Spread 10,002 0.1504 0.1475 0.0225 0.0458 0.1041 0.2076 0.3416 
Mve 10,002 4,771 11,669 121 317 923 3,162 11,670 
Bm 10,002 0.5211 0.4632 0.162 0.262 0.419 0.635 0.943 
Leverage 10,002 20.1953 18.8044 0 1.633 17.971 31.9905 45.5055 
Auditor 10,002 0.9153 0.2784 1 1 1 1 1 
StockExch 10,002 0.9696 0.1716 1 1 1 1 1 
Herf 10,002 10.4644 9.5428 4.0059 4.9259 7.8234 11.1554 20.8409 
Newfin 10,002 0.8802 0.3247 0 1 1 1 1 
Roa 10,002 0.0140 0.1497 -0.1346 -0.0042 0.0444 0.0846 0.1284 
Age 10,002 13.5585 10.2824 4 6 10 18 32 
Forecast error 10,002 0.1270 0.8513 -0.1724 -0.0592 -0.0058 0.0833 0.4444 
Dev. Forecast error 10,002 0.0690 0.1297 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.15 
Number analysts 10,002 8.4469 6.2905 3 4 6 11 18 
rpeg 10,002 0.1347 0.0443 0.1002 0.1067 0.1180 0.1665 0.1941 
Beta 10,002 1.1765 0.9368 0.3599 0.9133 1.0462 1.3680 2.2228 
Cov (ri, rsector) 10,002 0.0161 0.1668 -0.0513 -0.0137 0.0000 0.0192 0.0739 
Realized Returns 102,024 0.0161 0.2394 -0.2022 -0.0814 0.0017 0.0806 0.2145 
Excess Realized  Returns 102,024 0.0133 0.2394 -0.2052 -0.0841 -0.0008 0.0780 0.2117 
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The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Qtt_Seg = the number of voluntary disclosure elements found in the sample 
firms’ for segment disclosure; Qlt_Seg = the regression residuals obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t Qtt_Seg on control and determinants of 
segment disclosure (to report this number we used JM as the proxy for earnings management). Qtt_Seg_Bus = the number of voluntary disclosure elements 
found in the sample firms’ for business segment disclosure; Qlt_Seg_Bus = the regression residuals obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t 
Qtt_Seg_Bus on control and determinants of segment disclosure. Qtt_Seg_Geo = the number of voluntary disclosure elements found in the sample firms’ for 
geographic segment disclosure; Qlt_Seg_Geo = the regression residuals obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t Qtt_Seg_Geo on control and 
determinants of segment disclosure; Earnings_Qlt = the regression absolute residuals, and multiplied by –1, obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t 
change in revenues minus receivables and year t property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) (all variables scaled by total assets), where the regression is estimated 
using data from t = 2000–2006 (It is the Jones Modified model); BusDiversif = number of the different sectors in which firm operates. GeoDiversif = number 
of the different countries in which firm operates. Spread = bid-ask spread, calculated as 
2/)(
||
askbid
askbid
+
−
 measured in t-1. MVE = the firm’s market value of 
equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006; BM = the firm’s book-to-market ratio measured at the beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006; 
Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. Auditor = 1 if auditor firm is a Big-Four and 0 otherwise. StockExch = 1 if firm is listed in NYSE or 
NASDAQ and 0 otherwise. Herf = Herfindahl index in percentage, calculated as 
2
1
∑
=








=
N
i j
ij
j S
S
Herf . NewFin= 1 if firm has issued new debt or equity and 0 
otherwise. Roa = return on assets. Age = the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year. Forecast error= Analysts’ 
forecast errors. It is calculated as the value of forecasted eps for the year t – eps of the year t, scaled by market price per share in the year t.  Dev. Forecast 
error= Deviation of analysts’ forecast. It is calculated as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts of eps for the year t. Number of analysts = number of eps 
forecasts of the firm in the year t. rpeg = implied cost of equity estimate, derived from I/B/E/S eps forecasts and price target data. Beta = coefficient from firm-
specific CAPM regression using the 60 months preceding fiscal year 2001-2006. Cov (ri, rsector) = mean annual covariance of the monthly return of a firm with 
the monthly return of the sector in which the firm belongs. Realized returns = monthly realized returns. Excess realized returns = monthly excess realized 
returns over risk free rate. 
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Table 2 
Pairwise correlations between Qtt_Seg, Earnings Quality, diversification, information asymmetries and control variables (p=0.05) 
Variable Qtt_Seg Earnings_Qlt BusDiversif GeoDiversif Spread Ln mve Ln bm leverage auditor StockExch Herf NewFin Roa Age 
Qtt_Seg 1 
             
Eanings_Qlt 0.2178 1             
BusDiversif 0.3122 0.1299 1            
GeoDiversif 0.1053 0.0488 0.0536 1           
Spread 0.0283 0.0221 -0.0038 0.0172 1          
Ln mve 0.3399 0.2932 0.2234 0.0269 -0.0183 1         
Ln bm 0.0482 0.0703 0.0625 0.0147 0.0212 -0.2792 1        
Leverage 0.1178 0.1494 0.1368 0.0419 0.0525 0.1125 0.0082 1       
Auditor 0.1318 0.0659 0.0708 0.0049 0.0172 0.1903 -0.0170 0.0287 1      
StockExch 0.1180 0.2703 0.0464 0.0207 0.0195 0.1131 -0.0232 0.0199 0.0382 1     
Herf -0.0674 0.0869 0.0807 0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0080 0.0843 0.0993 0.0101 0.0403 1    
NewFin 0.1096 0.1080 0.0786 0.0221 0.0094 0.1918 -0.0861 0.1344 0.0548 0.0262 0.0453 1   
Roa 0.0504 0.1350 0.0232 0.0092 -0.0184 0.3834 -0.3257 -0.1637 0.0240 0.0569 0.0670 0.3164 1  
Age 0.1943 0.1597 0.1821 0.0152 -0.0190 0.2420 0.0002 0.0697 0.0521 -0.0228 0.0080 0.0785 0.1472 1 
   Bold numbers are significant at p-value 0.05.  
The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Qtt_Seg = the number of voluntary disclosure elements found in the sample firms’ for segment disclosure; Earnings_Qlt = the 
regression absolute residuals, and multiplied by –1, obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t change in revenues minus receivables and year t property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) (all variables scaled by total 
assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2006 (It is the Jones Modified model);  BusDiversif = number of the different sectors in which firm operates. GeoDiversif = number of the different 
countries in which firm operates. Spread = bid-ask spread, calculated as 
2/)(
||
askbid
askbid
+
− measured in t-1. Ln mve = the logarithm of firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-
2006; Ln bm = the logarithm of firm’s book-to-market ratio measured at the beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006; Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. Auditor = 1 if auditor firm is a Big-Four and 0 
otherwise. StockExch = 1 if firm is listed in NYSE or NASDAQ and 0 otherwise. Herf = Herfindahl index in percentage, calculated as 
2
1
∑
=








=
N
i j
ij
j S
S
Herf . NewFin= 1 if firm has issued new debt or equity and 0 
otherwise. Roa = percentile rank of return on assets. Age = the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year. 
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Table 3 
Fixed Effect Regression of Qtt_Seg on earnings quality, diversification, information asymmetries and control variables 
 
 
Variable 
 
Expected sign 
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Earnings_Qlt +  8.0612  (0.000) 
BusDiversif +  5.2727  (0.000) 
GeoDiversif +  0.2532 (0.000) 
Spread +  2.9581  (0.013) 
Ln mve + 4.5303 (0.000) 
3.9419  
(0.000) 
Ln bm + 4.3421 (0.000) 
3.9496  
(0.000) 
Leverage + 0.1006 (0.000) 
0.0844 
(0.000) 
Auditor + 2.7050 (0.000) 
2.3874  
(0.000) 
StockExch + 8.4118 (0.000) 
6.4297  
(0.000) 
Herf - -0.6394 (0.000) 
-0.4776 
(0.000) 
Newfin + 2.1688 (0.000) 
1.6418 
(0.000) 
Roa +/- -0.0373 (0.000) 
-0.0301 
(0.000) 
Age + 0.1941 (0.000) 
0.1173 
(0.000) 
Cons 
 
7.2229 
(0.000) 
2.4034  
(0.173) 
R2 
 
0.1700 0.2958 
      
The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Qtt_Seg = the number of voluntary disclosure elements found in the sample firms’ for segment disclosure; Earnings_Qlt = the 
regression absolute residuals, and multiplied by –1, obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t change in revenues minus receivables and year t property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) (all variables scaled by total 
assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2006 (It is the Jones Modified model);  BusDiversif = number of the different sectors in which firm operates. GeoDiversif = number of the different 
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countries in which firm operates. Spread = bid-ask spread, calculated as 
2/)(
||
askbid
askbid
+
− measured in t-1. Ln mve = the logarithm of firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-
2006; Ln bm = the logarithm of firm’s book-to-market ratio measured at the beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006; Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. Auditor = 1 if auditor firm is a Big-Four and 0 
otherwise. StockExch = 1 if firm is listed in NYSE or NASDAQ and 0 otherwise. Herf = Herfindahl index in percentage, calculated as 
2
1
∑
=








=
N
i j
ij
j S
S
Herf . NewFin= 1 if firm has issued new debt or equity and 0 
otherwise. Roa = percentile rank of return on assets. Age = the difference between the first year when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year. 
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Table 4 
Fixed Effect Regressions of analysts’ forecast errors on Quantity and Quality of segment disclosure and number of analysts following the 
firm 
 
 Expected 
sign 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
 
                    
Qtt_Seg ? -0.0001 (0.275)    
Qlt_Seg 
- 
 
-0.0074 
(0.006) 
-0.0073 
(0.000) 
0.0111 
(0.019) 
Dummy_Earnings_Qlt 
- 
  
-0.0507 
(0.003) 
0.0023 
(0.953) 
       Qlt_Seg*Dummy_Earnings_Qlt 
- 
   
-0.0146 
(0.023) 
Number analysts 
- 
-0.0021 
(0.118) 
-0.0017 
(0.285) 
-0.0017 
(0.293) 
-0.0015 
(0.440) 
Dev. Forecast error + 0.4816 (0.000) 
0.5968 
(0.000) 
0.5945 
(0.000) 
0.5613 
(0.000) 
Ln_mve 
- 
-0.0637 
(0.000) 
-0.0687 
(0.000) 
-0.0637 
(0.000) 
-0.0784 
(0.000) 
Cons 
 0.6957 
(0.000) 
0.7549 
(0.000) 
0.7468 
(0.000) 
0.7948 
(0.000) 
R2   0.0342 0.0368 0.0381 0.0385 
 
 
The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Forecast error= Analysts’ forecast errors. It is calculated as the absolute value 
of forecasted eps for the year t – eps of the year t, scaled by eps in the year t. Qtt_Seg = the number of voluntary disclosure elements (out of 34) found in the 
sample firms’ for segment disclosure; Qlt_Seg = the regression residuals obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t Qtt_Seg on control and determinants 
of segment disclosure. We then rank the residuals from this model into deciles. Dummy_Earnings_Qlt = it is dummy variable which takes value of 1 if 
Earnings_Qlt is above median, and zero otherwise, where Earnings_Qlt is equal to the regression absolute residuals, and multiplied by –1, obtained from a 
regression of the firm’s year t change in revenues minus receivables and year t property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) (all variables scaled by total assets), 
where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2006 (It is the Jones Modified model). Acc_Qlt = 0 if the firm does not provide good accounting 
quality, 1 if firm provides earnings quality above the median of earnings quality of the sample or if it provides good segment information (the regression 
residuals obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t Qtt_Seg on control and determinants of segment disclosure are positive), and 2 if a firm provides good 
earnings quality (above median of earnings quality) and good segment information (positive residuals). Number of analysts = number of eps forecasts of the 
firm in the year t. Dev. Forecast error= Deviation of analysts’ forecast. It is calculated as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts of eps for the year t. Ln 
mve = the logarithm of firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006. 
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Table 5 
Fixed Effect Regressions of assessed covariance with sector firms’ return on Quantity and Quality of segment disclosure and controls 
 
 Expected 
sign 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
 
                    
Qtt_Seg ? -0.0006 (0.184)    
Qlt_Seg 
- 
 
-0.0010 
(0.000) 
-0.0010 
(0.007) 
0.0002 
(0.719) 
Dummy_Earnings_Qlt 
- 
  
-0.0061 
(0.016) 
0.0066 
(0.194) 
       Qlt_Seg*Dummy_Earnings_Qlt 
- 
   
-0.0023 
(0.004) 
Ln mve 
- 
-0.0024 
(0.008) 
-0.0032 
(0.000) 
-0.0026 
(0.003) 
-0.0024 
(0.006) 
Ln bm + 0.0148 (0.000) 
0.0140 
(0.000) 
0.0146 
(0.000) 
0.0148 
(0.000) 
Herf 
- 
-0.0940 
(0.055) 
-0.0825 
(0.091) 
-0.0821 
(0.093) 
-0.0839 
(0.086) 
Leverage + 0.0001 (0.028) 
0.0001 
(0.048) 
0.0001 
(0.026) 
0.0001 
(0.024) 
BusDiversif 
- 
-0.0006 
(0.587) 
-0.0016 
(0.160) 
-0.0016 
(0.159) 
-0.0016 
(0.168) 
GeoDiversif 
- 
-0.0001 
(0.579) 
-0.0002 
(0.474) 
-0.0001 
(0.480) 
-0.0001 
(0.489) 
StockExch 
- 
-0.0133 
(0.005) 
-0.0152 
(0.027) 
-0.0142 
(0.039) 
-0.0139 
(0.043) 
Roa + 0.0001 (0.006) 
0.0001 
(0.005) 
0.0001 
(0.004) 
0.0001 
(0.005) 
Age 
- 
-0.0002 
(0.089) 
-0.0002 
(0.067) 
-0.0002 
(0.089) 
-0.0002 
(0.067) 
Cons 
 0.1067 
(0.000) 
0.1133 
(0.000) 
0.1110 
(0.000) 
0.1034 
(0.000) 
R2   0.0271 0.0272 0.0280 0.0294 
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The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. Cov (ri, rsector) = mean annual covariance of the monthly return of a firm with the monthly return of the sector in which the firm 
belongs, expressed in percentage and in absolute values. Qtt_Seg = the number of voluntary disclosure elements (out of 34) found in the sample firms’ for segment disclosure; Qlt_Seg = the regression residuals 
obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t Qtt_Seg on control and determinants of segment disclosure. We then rank the residuals from this model into deciles. Dummy_Earnings_Qlt = it is dummy variable 
which takes value of 1 if Earnings_Qlt is above median, and zero otherwise, where Earnings_Qlt is equal to the regression absolute residuals, and multiplied by –1, obtained from a regression of the firm’s year 
t change in revenues minus receivables and year t property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) (all variables scaled by total assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2006 (It is the Jones 
Modified model).  Ln mve = the logarithm of firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006; Ln bm = the logarithm of firm’s book-to-market ratio measured at the 
beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006. Herf = Herfindahl index in percentage, calculated as 
2
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Herf .  Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. BusDiversif = number of the different 
sectors in which firm operates. GeoDiversif = number of the different countries in which firm operates. Roa = percentile rank of return on assets. Age = the difference between the first year when the firm 
appears in CRSP and the current year. 
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Table 6 
Pairwise correlations between rPEG, Qtt_Seg and Qlt_Seg, Earnings Quality and control variables (p=0.05) 
 
Variable rPEG Qtt_Seg Qlt_Seg DumEarQlt Ln mve 
 
Ln bm 
 
Beta 
 
Leverage 
 
BusDiversif 
 
GeoDiversif 
 
rPEG 
 
1          
Qtt_Seg -0.0033 1         
Qlt_Seg -0.1283 0.7087 1        
Dummy_Earnings_Qlt -0.1236 0.2207 -0.0039 1       
Ln mve -0.1888 0.3399 -0.0032 0.2936 1      
Ln bm 0.1813 0.0482 0.0047 0.0218 -0.2792 1     
Beta 0.0921 0.0090 0.0004 0.0095 -0.0413 0.0320 1    
Leverage 0.1222 0.1178 -0.0071 0.0995 0.1125 0.0082 0.0149 1   
BusDiversif -0.0852 0.3122 -0.0094 0.1231 0.2234 0.0625 -0.0137 0.1368 1  
GeoDiversif -0.0600 0.1053 0.0002 0.0413 0.0269 0.0147 0.0342 0.0419 0.0536 1 
          Bold numbers are significant at p-value 0.05 
The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. rpeg = implied cost of equity estimate, derived from I/B/E/S eps forecasts and price target data; Qtt_Seg = the number of 
voluntary disclosure elements found in the sample firms’ for segment disclosure; Dummy_Earnings_Qlt = it is dummy variable which takes value of 1 if Earnings_Qlt is above median, and zero 
otherwise, where Earnings_Qlt is equal to the regression absolute residuals, and multiplied by –1, obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t change in revenues minus receivables and year t 
property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) (all variables scaled by total assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2006 (It is the Jones Modified model).  Ln mve = the logarithm 
of firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006; Ln bm = the logarithm of firm’s book-to-market ratio measured at the beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006.  
Beta = coefficient from firm-specific CAPM regression using the 60 months preceding fiscal year 2001-2006. Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. BusDiversif = number of the different 
sectors in which firm operates. GeoDiversif = number of the different countries in which firm operates.  
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Table 7 
Fixed Effect Regression of implied cost of capital (rPEG) on earnings quality, quality of segment disclosure (Qlt_Seg) and control variables 
 
Variable Expected sign Coef. 
(p-value) 
 Coef. 
(p-value) 
 Coef. 
(p-value) 
 Coef. 
(p-value) 
 Coef. 
(p-value) 
           
Qtt_Seg ?   -0.0002 (0.264)       
Qlt_Seg 
- 
    
-0.0021 
(0.000)  
-0.0021 
(0.000)  
-0.0003 
(0.115) 
Dummy_Earnings_Qlt 
- 
      
-0.0139 
(0.000)  
0.0035 
(0.100) 
       Qlt_Seg*Dummy_Earnings_Qlt 
- 
        
-0.0032 
(0.000) 
Ln mve 
- 
-0.0035 
(0.000)  
-0.0032 
(0.000)  
-0.0036 
(0.000)  
-0.0021 
(0.000)  
-0.0019 
(0.000) 
Ln bm + 0.0080 (0.000)  
0.0078 
(0.000)  
0.0080 
(0.000)  
0.0093 
(0.000)  
0.0096 
(0.000) 
Beta +/- 0.0052 (0.000)  
0.0055 
(0.000)  
0.0053 
(0.000)  
  0.0051 
(0.000)  
0.0051 
(0.000) 
Leverage + 0.0001 (0.000)  
0.0001 
(0.000)  
0.0001 
(0.000)  
0.0001 
(0.000)  
0.0001 
(0.000) 
BusDiversif 
- 
-0.0015 
(0.000)  
-0.0010 
(0.197)  
-0.0015 
(0.003)  
-0.0015 
(0.003)  
-0.0014 
(0.005) 
GeoDiversif 
- 
-0.0007 
(0.000)  
-0.0007 
(0.000)  
-.0007 
(0.000)  
-0.0007 
(0.000)  
-0.0007 
(0.000) 
Cons 
 
0.1699 
(0.000)  
0.1752 
(0.000)  
0.1826 
(0.000)  
0.1796 
(0.000)  
0.1693 
(0.000) 
R2  0.0716  0.0720  0.0895  0.1046  0.1134 
 
The sample consists of 10,002 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2006. rpeg = implied cost of equity estimate, derived from I/B/E/S eps forecasts and price target data; Qtt_Seg = the number of 
voluntary disclosure elements found in the sample firms’ for segment disclosure; Dummy_Earnings_Qlt = it is dummy variable which takes value of 1 if Earnings_Qlt is above median, and zero 
otherwise, where Earnings_Qlt is equal to the regression absolute residuals, and multiplied by –1, obtained from a regression of the firm’s year t change in revenues minus receivables and year t 
property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) (all variables scaled by total assets), where the regression is estimated using data from t = 2000–2006 (It is the Jones Modified model).  Ln mve = the logarithm 
of firm’s market value of equity measured at the beginning of fiscal year for 2001-2006; Ln bm = the logarithm of firm’s book-to-market ratio measured at the beginning of fiscal year 2001-2006.  
Beta = coefficient from firm-specific CAPM regression using the 60 months preceding fiscal year 2001-2006. Leverage = debt to total assets ratio in percentage. BusDiversif = number of the different 
sectors in which firm operates. GeoDiversif = number of the different countries in which firm operates.  
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Table 8 
Tests of the Relation between Realized Cost of Capital and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Descriptive data 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Annualized return 
RMRF 0.0026 0.0411 3.1650% 
SMB 0.0068 0.0292 8.4722% 
HML 0.0082 0.0291 10.2961% 
HILOQlt_Seg -0.0051 0.0218 6.2946% 
HILOEarnings_Qlt -0.0025 0.0421 3.0415% 
HILOAcc_Qlt -0.0071 0.0610 8.7310% 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix  
Variable RMRF SMB HML HILOQlt_Seg HILOAQ HILOAcc_Qlt 
RMRF 1      
SMB 0.3308 
 
1 
 
    
HML -0.4618 
 
-0.2407 
 
1    
HILOQlt_Seg 0.0324 
 
-0.2163 
 
0.4018 
 
1 
 
  
HILOEarnings_Qlt 0.0624 
 
-0.2421 
 
0.5009 
 
0.3925 
 
1 
 
 
HILOAcc_Qlt 0.0435 
 
-0.3651 
 
0.3069 
 
0.4009 
 
0.6927 
 
1 
 
   Bold numbers are significant at p-value 0.05 
 
 
The sample consists of 102,024 firm-month observations for the period 2001-2006. RMRF is the excess return on the market portfolio. SMB is the return to size factor-mimicking portfolio. 
HML is the return to book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolio. HILOEarnings_Qlt is the portfolio that results on hedge earnings quality portfolio, buying 20% of firms providing good 
earnings quality and selling 20% of firms providing poor earnings quality. HEDGE Qlt_Seg is the portfolio that results on hedge segment information quality portfolio, buying 20% of firms 
providing good segment quality information and selling 20% of firms providing poor segment quality information. HEDGE Acc_Qlt is the portfolio that results on hedge accounting information 
quality portfolio, buying firms providing good segment quality information and selling firms providing poor segment quality information. 
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Table 9 
Firm-specific time-series regressions of contemporaneous excess returns on the Fama –French 3 factors 
 
 
 
HEDGE Earnings_Qlt 
 
 
HEDGE Qlt_Seg 
 
HEDGE Acc_Qlt 
 
Variable 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
RMRF 0.00043  (0.000) 
0.00017 
(0.000) 
0.00108 
(0.000) 
SMB -0.00032 (0.000) 
-0.00015 
(0.000) 
-0.00011 
(0.000) 
HML 0.00090  (0.000) 
0.00037 
(0.000) 
0.00131 
(0.000) 
cons 
-0.00006 
(0.000) 
-0.00030 
(0.000) 
-0.00052 
(0.000) 
R2 0.4076 0.2588 0.5201 
 
                
The sample consists of 102,024 firm-month observations for the period 2001-2006. RMRF is the excess return on the market portfolio. SMB is the return to size factor-mimicking portfolio. HML is 
the return to book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolio. HEDGE Earnings_Qlt is the portfolio that results on hedge earnings quality portfolio, buying 20% of firms providing good earnings quality 
and selling 20% of firms providing poor earnings quality. HEDGE Qlt_Seg is the portfolio that results on hedge segment information quality portfolio, buying 20% of firms providing good segment 
quality information and selling 20% of firms providing poor segment quality information. HEDGE Acc_Qlt is the portfolio that results on hedge accounting information quality portfolio, buying 
firms providing good segment quality information and selling firms providing poor segment quality information. 
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Table 10 
Average factor loadings across 25 portfolios sorted on B/M and Accounting Quality 
 
 
Variable  
 CAPM 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
                                    FF 3 FACTOR MODEL 
                                   Coef. 
                                  (p-value) 
 
 
  
      
 
              
 
SMB       0.8552 (0.000) 
0.8583 
(0.000) 
0.7951 
(0.000) 
0.8532 
(0.000) 
HML       0.0993 (0.064) 
0.0765 
(0.097) 
0.2126 
(0.037) 
0.1225 
(0.098) 
RMRF   1.3811 (0.000) 
1.3811 
(0.000) 
1.2640 
(0.000) 
1.4032 
(0.000) 
1.2127 
(0.000) 
1.2062 
(0.000) 
1.2035 
(0.000) 
1.2318 
(0.000) 
HILOQlt_Seg -0.8118 (0.000) 
-0.6590 
(0.000)  
-0.7269 
(0.031) 
-0.4287 
(0.009)   
-0.4761 
(0.087) 
-0.2098 
(0.067)  
HILOEarnings_Qlt  -0.3894 (0.000)   
-0.0131 
(0.096)    
-0.0683 
(0.120)  
HILOAcc_Qlt      -0.3538 (0.049)    
-0.3764 
(0.058) 
cons 
0.1679 
(0.055) 
0.1786 
(0.036) 
0.1330 
(0.003) 
0.1330 
(0.002) 
0.1362 
(0.003) 
0.1351 
(0.006) 
0.0761 
(0.001) 
0.0763 
(0.005) 
0.0727 
(0.001) 
0.0754 
(0.002) 
R2  0.0055 0.2630 0.7539 0.7579 0.7924 0.7648 0.8903 0.8946 0.9065 0.8958 
GRS test cons = 0 5.71 5.75 13.37 13.70 13.70 13.55 13.02 12.54 12.15 12.66 
p-value GRS test  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GRS test on all factors = 0 9.36 32.64 54.36 31.41 39.84 32.91 50.81 39.65 42.03 39.86 
p-value GRS test  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
                
The sample consists of 102,024 firm-month observations for the period 2001-2006. We form 25 portfolios sorting stocks into quintiles based on B/M and Acc_Qlt each month. RMRF is the excess return on the market 
portfolio. SMB is the return to size factor-mimicking portfolio. HML is the return to book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolio. HILOQlt_Seg factor is the return to the segment quality factor-mimicking portfolio for 
Qlt_Seg. HILOEarnings_Qlt factor is the return to the earnings quality factor-mimicking portfolio for Earnings_Qlt. HILAcc_Qlt factor is the return to the accounting quality factor-mimicking portfolio for Acc_Qlt.  
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Table 11 
Two-stage regressions, based on realized returns of 25 portfolios sorted on B/M and Accounting Quality 
 
Variable   
CAPM 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
 
                                     FF 3 FACTOR MODEL 
                                     Coef. 
                                     (p-value) 
 
 
  
                      
SMB       -0.1481 (0.006) 
-0.0680 
(0.179) 
-0.1027 
(0.057) 
-0.1517 
(0.003) 
HML       -0.0300 (0.624) 
-0.0938 
(0.065) 
-0.1112 
(0.007) 
-0.0533 
(0.288) 
RMRF   0.2061 (0.028) 
0.1922 
(0.014) 
0.1883 
(0.000) 
0.1316 
(0.203) 
0.2393 
(0.004) 
0.2767 
(0.000) 
0.1552 
(0.138) 
0.1387 
(0.121) 
HILOQlt_Seg -0.0198 (0.000) 
-0.0179 
(0.000)  
-0.0187 
(0.002) 
-0.0186 
(0.003)   
-0.0187 
(0.003) 
-0.0163 
(0.006)  
HILOEarnings_Qlt 
 
 
-0.0127 
(0.074)   
-0.0004 
(0.968)    
-0.0150 
(0.180)  
HILOAcc_Qlt      -0.0091 (0.416)    
-0.0148 
(0.014) 
cons 
1.9404 
(0.000) 
1.8493 
(0.000) 
-0.5824 
(0.577) 
-0.3754 
(0.665) 
-0.0005 
(0.000) 
0.2978 
(0.808) 
0.2603 
(0.772) 
-0.6522 
(0.395) 
1.0148 
(0.464) 
1.5227 
(0.139) 
R2  0.2473 0.3552 0.2004 0.4207 0.5201 0.2231 0.4076 0.5620 0.6065 0.4624 
 
The sample consists of 102,024 firm-month observations for the period 2001-2006. We form 25 portfolios sorting stocks into quintiles based on B/M and Acc_Qlt each month. RMRF is the excess return on the market 
portfolio. SMB is the return to size factor-mimicking portfolio. HML is the return to book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolio. HILOQlt_Seg factor is the return to the segment quality factor-mimicking portfolio for 
Qlt_Seg. HILOEarnings_Qlt factor is the return to the earnings quality factor-mimicking portfolio for Earnings_Qlt. HILAcc_Qlt factor is the return to the accounting quality factor-mimicking portfolio for Acc_Qlt.  
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